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RCRA AND THE RECOVERY OF PAST CLEAN-UP COSTS:
MEGHRJG v. K0C WESTERN, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Government has enacted over forty environ-
mental laws during the past century in an attempt to control the
ever increasing pollution of the environment.1 Beginning in the
1960s, as the number of federal environmental regulations was rap-
idly increasing, general dissatisfaction over the effectiveness of such
regulations grew.2 This dissatisfaction led to the passage of regula-
tions which permitted "citizen suits."3
1. See Wniujm H. RODGERS, JR., EmrmoaolmNTA. LAw vihi-ix (2d ed. 1994 &
Supp. 1995) (reproducing "an illustrative, not exhaustive list" of 42 separate envi-
ronmental acts passed by United States Government since 1899). A graph that
accompanies the list shows an exponential increase in both United States environ-
mental laws and international environmental treaties over the course of the past
century. See id. at viii. For a discussion of the development of substantive environ-
mental law through the public trust doctrine, see Joseph R. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471
(1970) (discussing judicial forerunner to statutory citizen suit).
2. SeeJEFFREY G. MALLER, ENvmoEnvNTAL LAw INSTnUTE, CrrzEN Surrs: PRi-
VATE ENFoRcEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTbON CONTROL LAws 3 (1987) (stating "[t]he
enforcement mechanisms of federal environmental statutes in the 1960s were both
cumbersome and ineffective"). Miller writes that as "interest in environmental
protection grew, awareness of the lack of credible enforcement mechanisms and
credible state and federal enforcement programs ... led directly to the significant
enhancement of federal enforcement tools in the environmental legislation of the
1970s and to the creation of citizen suits." Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted). For a
general discussion of the dissatisfaction with governmental agencies' efforts to en-
force environmental statutes, see FREDIcK ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION: LAW AND Pouc' 111 (2d ed. 1990).
3. For a general discussion of citizen suits in environmental acts, see Adeeb
Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking up the Pace, 9 HAlv. ENvrL. L. Rx,. 23
(1985). Fadil discusses the rationale behind citizen suits, giving four reasons to
have such provisions in environmental statutes:
First, private citizens immediately affected by pollution may be in a better
position than public authorities to assess the costs and benefits of en-
f ment actions. Second, citizen suits may be less expensive than com-
parable government actions. Third, citizen suits expand the scope of
enforcement without burdening the public treasury. Finally, such suits-
actual or threatened-may serve to prod public authorities into enforc-
ing environmental laws with increased zeal.
Id. at 24. See also Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement:
A Preliminamy Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L
REv. 833, 946-57 (1985) (tracing history of citizen suit back at least 600 years in
Anglo-American law); Thomas J. Kelly, Jr., Liabilities and Enforcement in ENVuLON-
MENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 495,506 (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 13th ed. 1995) (show-
ing citizen suit of environmental statutes in light of other enforcement schemes).
(627)
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The passage of the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act
(CAA) sparked the proliferation of citizen suit provisions in federal
environmental statutes.4 In 1976, Congress enacted the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) as a qualified prohibition
on the open dumping of solid or hazardous waste.5 In 1984, Con-
gress amended RCRA's citizen suit provision to allow individuals to
bring suit for endangerments to health or the environmenL 6
Meghrig v. KFC, Western, Inc. (KFC) 7 illustrates a recent conflict over
the remedies available under RCRA's citizen suit provision.8 In
KFC, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether RCRA's
4. See CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994). The Clean Air Act's (CAA)
citizen suit provision states that "any person may commence a civil action on his
own behalf- (1) against any person ... who is alleged to have violated ... or to be
in violation [of Clean Air Act]." Id. § 304(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1). For a
discussion of the CAA and its citizen suit provision, see VICTOR YANNACONF ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES § 5:12 (1972 & Supp. 1988)). Since the en-
actment of the CAA, Congress has included citizen suit provisions in a great major-
ity of federal environmental legislation, using the CAA as a model. See ZYGMUNT
PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 571 (1992) (listing Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994)); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g) (1994)); Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1994); Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1994); Energy
Sources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988); Energy Policy and Conserva-
tion Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (1988); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 8435 (1988); Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9124 (1988)
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1349 (1988); see also Mn-ILR, supra note 2, at 7 (stating "citizen suit sections of
various environmental statutes are virtually identical, being patterned closely after
Clean Air Act § 304"); RODGERS, supra note 1, at § 21 (describing CAA's citizen suit
as basis for all other environmental citizen suits).
5. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580,
90 Stat. 2795 (1976), (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1994)). Con-
gress originally enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA) under the name The Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA). For a discussion
of SWDA and the changes it underwent as a result of the 1976 passage of RCRA,
see RODGERS, supra note 1, at § 7.1. See also Gail H. Allyn & Paul W. Pocalyko,
Liability for Environmental Problems under Federal Statutes, in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL DIS-
PuTE HANDBOOK: LIABnrrY AND CLAIms §§ 2.15-23 (David Carpenter et al. eds.,
1991 & Supp. 1996) (giving general overview of all facets of RCRA, induding its
purpose and availability of citizen suits).
RCRA's original citizen suit provision contained two types of suits available to
individuals, namely, actions against the Administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and against those in violation of RCRA's statutory provision. See
RCRA §§ 7002 (a) (2), (a) (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972 (a) (2), (a) (1) (1994).
6. See RCRA § 7002 (a) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a) (1) (B). RCRA's 1984
amendments broadened the scope of RCRA's citizen suit provision. For a discus-
sion of RCRA's 1984 amendments, see infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
7. 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
8. For further discussion of the conflict over the remedies of RCRA's citizen
suit provision, see infra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
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citizen suit provision provides a right to recover the costs of a past
clean-up of hazardous waste that did not present an imminent dan-
ger to health or the environment at the time of suit.9
This Note addresses the issues resolved by the Court in KFC.
Part II begins with a discussion of RCRA's legislative history. 10 Part
II then addresses how courts have interpreted RCRA, focusing on
whether the citizen suit provision of RCRA authorizes monetary
awards for the recovery of clean-up costs." Next, Part III discusses
the facts of KFC.12 Parts W analyzes the Court's interpretation of
the citizen suit provision of RCRA.' 3 Part V critiques the Court's
determination that RCRA does not authorize monetary awards for
clean-up costs at a site that does not endanger health or the envi-
ronment at the time of suit.14 Finally, Part VI considers the implica-
tions and effects of the Court's decision in KFC.15
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has described RCRA as a "comprehensive
environmental statute that empowers EPA to regulate hazardous
wastes from cradle to grave."' 6 The purpose of RCRA is to "assist
the cities, counties and states in the solution of the discarded mater-
ials problem and to provide nationwide protection against the
dangers of improper hazardous waste disposal." 17 To this end,
9. See KFC 116 S. Ct. at 1253.
10. For a discussion of the legislative history of RCRA, see infra notes 16-26
and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of how federal courts have interpreted RCRA, see infra
notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the facts of KFt see infra notes 67-76 and accompany-
ing text.
13. For a discussion of the Court's interpretation of KFC see infra notes 76-
104 and accompanying text.
14. For a critique of the Court's decision in KFC, see infra notes 106-45 and
accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the implications and effects of the Court's decision in
KFC see infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
16. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994)
(holding that ash from incineration of household waste and nonhazardous indus-
trial waste used to create energy suject to regulatory scheme setforth in RCRA).
The Court further described RCRA as having the two goals of "encouraging re-
source recovery and protecting against contamination." Id. at 339. RCRA was also
described as the instrument that "delegated to the [EPA] vast regulatory authority
over the mountains of garbage that our society generates." Id. at 340 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). For an overview of RCRA, including its policy goals and objectives, see
David R. Case, Resource Conservation and Recovey Act, in ENvmoNemENTAL LAw HAND-
BOOK 44, 44-47 (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 13th ed. 1995) (providing graphic of
"RCRA 'Cradle to Grave' System").
17. H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. at
6238, 6249. RCRA aims to:
3
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RCRA contains a broad definition of hazardous waste, including
"solid waste" that "pose[s] a hazard to human health or the
environment."' 8
A. Enforcement of RCRA
RCRA grants the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the
authority to enforce federal hazardous waste regulations by way of
compliance orders, criminal penalties and civil penalties.' 9 Similar
to other environmental statutes, 20 RCRA includes a citizen suit pro-
vision which allows private individuals to bring suit for violations of
[p]rovide[ ] the groundwork for solving the discarded materials disposal
problem and for minimizing the dangers of hazardous waste disposal. At
the same time [RCRA] proposes a way to lessen the drain on our domes-
tic resources and to decrease our dependence on foreign sources of raw
materials and energy, both of which can be reclaimed from waste. Most
important, [RCRA] is a needed step toward protecting the purity of the
land itself, and health of our people and the vitality of our environment.
Id. While the United States' dependence on foreign raw materials and energy was
a reason behind the passage of RCRA, the House Committee also stated that
"(h)azardous wastes typically have little, if any, economic value." Id. at 4. Instead,
the Committee's "overriding concern" was the effect that "harmful, toxic or lethal"
discarded hazardous wastes have on the "population and the environment." Id. at
3.
18. RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). RCRA's definition of hazardous
waste is:
[a] solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quan-
tity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics
may--
(A) cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or
an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible
illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health
or the environment when improperly treated, stored, trans-
ported, or disposed of or otherwise managed.
Id. RCRA broadly defines solid waste as "any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste
treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and
other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous
material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural opera-
tions, and from community activities .... " Id. § 1004(27), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27).
19. See id. § 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a). Section 6928, provides in relevant
part: "[W]henever... the Administrator determines that any person has violated
or is in violation of any requirement ... the Administrator may issue an order
assessing a civil penalty for any past or current violation.., or the Administrator
may commence a civil action in the United States district court . . . ." Id.
§ 3008(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (a) (1). Section 6973 provides in relevant part:
(a) upon receipt of evidence that the past or present handling, storage,
treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or
hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to health or the environment, the Administrator may bring
suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate district court
Id. § 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a).
20. For a list of environmental statutes similar to RCRA, see supra note 4.
4
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RCRA's provisions. 21 The general purpose of the citizen suit provi-
sion is to allow citizen plaintiffs to act as "private attorneys gen-
eral."22 Private citizens may bring suit against either individuals
who have allegedly violated RCRA or against EPA for failure to per-
form its duties under RCRA.2 3 Additionally, RCRA's citizen suit
provision also protects the right to bring suit under other statutes
and at common law.24
In 1984, Congress amended the citizen suit provision in RCRA,
granting a private citizen the power to bring a cause of action on
his own behalf against any person who, in the past or present, has
generated, transported, handled, stored, treated or disposed of haz-
ardous waste which causes an imminent and substantial danger to
the environment.25 Congress also expanded the remedies that dis-
21. See RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972. For the language of the citizen suit
provision, see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
22. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 14 n.23 (1981) (holding that no implied right of action exists under Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act and Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuar-
ies Act of 1972). Many courts have quoted the phrase "private attorneys general"
from Middesex when deciding cases arising under RCRA's citizen suit provision.
See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 337 (4th Cir.
1983); Cache v. Town of Harrison, N.Y., 813 F. Supp. 1037, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
Commerce Holding Co. v. Buckstone, 749 F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
23. See RCRA § 7002(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a) (2). RCRA, like the CAA, has
a provision for citizens to bring suit "against the Administrator where there is al-
leged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty ... which is not
discretionary with the Administrator." Id. This language appears to be taken di-
rectly from the CAA's citizen suit provision. See CAA § 304(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.§ 7604(a) (2) (describing ability to bring suit against Administrator of CAA- "Any
person may commence a civil action on his own behalf... (2) against the Adminis-
trator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or
duty... which is not discretionary with the Administrator").
24. See RCRA § 7002(0, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (stating "[n]othing in [this sec-
tion of RCRA] shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may
have under any statute or common law"). See Joyce Yeager, Note, No Remedy for
Lust: An Implied Cause of Action and RCRA, 64 UMKC L. Rxv. 637, 659-62 (1996)(providing possible alternatives to RCRA citizen suits, including claims under state
law).
25. See RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). The statute provides in relevant
part:
any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) (B) against any person, including ... any past or present generator,
past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator
of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed
or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage,
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste which may present an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to health or the environment ....
Id. It appears that Congress wanted to limit the citizen suit to injunctive relief
only. See H.R. REP. No. 98-198, at 53 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576,
5612 (1984). The House report stated that the citizen suit provision "confers on
5
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trict courts could grant to claimants under RCRA, giving the courts
the power to order a party to "take any such action as may be neces-
sary" to grant relief to the plaintiff in a civil suit.26
B. Timing Requirements
RCRA imposes timing restrictions on the public's ability to
bring a citizen suit.2 7 For example, a private citizen may only bring
suit against an individual involved with the hazardous waste if the
waste "present[s] an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment."28 In doing so, a potential plaintiff
must give the EPA Administrator and potential defendants ninety-
citizens a limited right.., to sue to abate an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment." Id. (emphasis added). The report continued that the goal of the citizen
suit provision was "the prom pt abatement of imminent and substantial endanger-
ments." Id (emphasis added). See also H.R. REP. No. 98-1133, at 79-131 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.ALN. 5649, 5649-5702 (describing changes to RCRA); S.
REP. No. 98-284, at 56 (1983) (stating "[t]hese amendments are intended to allow
citizens exactly the same broad substantive and procedural claim for relief which is
already available to the United State (sic) under section 7003"). One commenta-
tor has described RCRA's amended citizen suit provision as both broader and nar-
rower than other environmental citizen suits. See THE RCRA PIAcrcE MANUAL
234 (Theodore Garret ed., 1994) (stating that RCRA's citizen suit provision is
broad, because actions can be brought to abate hazards that are not violations of
RCRA and because civil penalties are available; RCRA's civil suit provision is nar-
row, because evidentiary burden is higher than other environmental statutes, and
RCRA's regulatory program is more complex). For a general discussion of the
1984 amendments to RCRA, see RODGERS, supra note 1, at § 7.1.
26. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 US.C. § 6972(a). The district court has jurisdiction
"to restrain any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste.. . to order such person to take such other action as may be
necessary, or both." Id For a discussion of injunctive relief, see 1 LAw oF ENm-
RONMENTAL PROTErCTION § 8.01[8] [bi [iii] (Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds., 1996)
[hereinafter ENmONMENTAL PROTECTION].
27. See RCRA §§ 7002(b) (2) (A),(B),(C), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(b) (2) (A),(B),(C).
The Court has described RCRA's use of the terms "to restrain" and "to order" as
the timing requirements for a citizen suit. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S.
Ct. 1251, 1254 (1996).
28. RCRA § 7002 (a) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a) (1) (B) (emphasis added).
The Ninth Circuit found that RCRA's use of the timing requirement as "immi-
nent" implied "that there must be a threat which is present now, although the
impact of the threat may not be felt until later." Price v. United States Navy, 39
F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994).
This "imminent and substantial" requirement is very broad in some respects,
because it gives individuals the ability to seek abatement of hazardous solid wastes,
even if no other violation of the statute has occured. See 1 LAW oF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECrION, supra note 26, at § 8.0118] [b] [i] ("[I] t should be noted that [RCRA's
citizen suit] also authorizes a citizen to seek abatement of imminent and substan-
tial endangerments caused by solid waste, whether or not the endangerment re-
sults from a violation of the statute .... No statute other than RCRA contains such
authority for citizens.").
6
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/9
KFC WEsTERN, INC.
days advance notice before filing suiLt Further, RCRA prohibits a
citizen suit if EPA or a state government has brought an action
against the alleged offenders.30
C. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Comprehensive
and Liability Act of 1980
The Court has defined RCRA's terms by making a series of
comparisons to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
prehensive and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) .3 Congress passed
CERCLA in order to guarantee the "prompt clean-up of hazardous
waste sites and [to] impos[e]... clean-up costs on the responsible
party."3 2 However, CERCLA, unlike RCRA, does not include petro-
leum contaminated substances in its definition of hazardous
29.W See RCRA § 7002 (b) (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (2) (A). Ninety days no-
tice must be given to "(i) the Administrator; (ii) the State in which the alleged
endangerment may occur, (iii) any person alleged to have [violated RCRA]"
before an action under the citizen suit provision may be brought." Id. An excep-
tion to the notice requirement was allowed in one case when there was a danger
that hazardous waste would be discharged if no action was taken. See Hallstrom v.
Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1989) (noting abrogation of notice require-
ment when there is danger that hazardous waste will be discharged).
30. See RCRA §§ 7002 (b)(2)(B),(C), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(b)(2)(B), (C). Pursu-
ant to section 6972 (b) (2) (B), no action may be commenced under the citizen suit
provision of RCRA if the Administrator (i) has commenced an action under CER-
CLA, (ii) has begun a removal action under CERCLA; (iii) has begun a Remedial
Investigation and Feasibility Study under CERCLA (iv) has obtained a court order
under CERCIA. See id. § 7002(b) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (2)(B). Section C is
similar to section B, but section C refers to the "State" in the place of the "Adminis-
trator" named in section B. See id. at § 7002(b) (2) (C), § 6972(b) (2) (C) (stating
that individual's citizen suit is barred if State has brought suit itself).
31. See KFC 116 S. Ct. at 1254. The Court stated that "[u]nlike [CERCLAI,
RCRA is not principally designed to effectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites or to
compensate those who have attended to the remediation of environmental
hazards." Id. at 1254 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys.,
Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990)). For a comparison of RCRA with CER-
CLA, see Robert G. Stoll, The New RCRA Cleanup Regime: Comparisons and Contrasts
with CERCLA, 44 Sw. LJ. 1299 (1991).
32. GenwraE/etric, 920 F.2d at 1422 (holding that private parties were entitled
to recover attorney fees and expenses). For a portion of the legislative history of
CERCLA, see S. REP. No. 96-848, at 2 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 96-1016(I), at 2
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. For the legislative purpose of
CERCIA, see H.R. REP. No. 99-253, at 5 (1986). In describing the purposes for
passing CERCLA, the House stated that "CERCIA has two goals: (1) to provide for
cleanup if a hazardous substance is released into the environment or if such re-
lease is threatened, and (2) to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these
cleanups." Id. Congress enacted CERCLA in order to "initiate and establish a
comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast
problems associated with abandoned and inactive waste disposal sites." H.R. REP.
No. 96-1016(I), at 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6125. The overriding pur-
pose of CERCLA is "to protect the lives, the health, and the safety and the well-
being of the American public from ... nauseating toxic wastes that litter our coun-
1997] 633
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waste. 33
CERCLA's citizen suit provision is similar to RCRA's citizen suit
provision, yet there are important differences.3 4 While CERCLA ex-
pressly allows the government and private citizens to recover re-
sponse costs, RCRA contains no such provision.3 5 Additionally,
try by the thousand." 132 CONG. REc. H9,599 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Scheuer).
For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of CERCLA, see Frank P.
Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 CoLUM. J. EwrrL. L. 1 (1982). Grad de-
scribes the passage of CERCLA as having "virtually no legislative history at all,"
because CERCIA "was hurriedly put together by a bipartisan leadership group of
senators (with some assistance from their House counterparts)." Id. at 1. Grad
further notes that CERCLA was considered and passed "after very limited debate,
under a suspension of the rules." Id.; see also SAM COOK, THE LAW OF HAzARDOUS
WAsTh § 12.03(1) (1995) (discussing circumstances under which Congress passed
CERCLA).
33. See CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). CERCLA defines "hazard-
ous substances" in part by citing to the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 6921), to which RCRA is an amendment. See id. § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
CERCLA, however, states that hazardous waste "does not include petroleum,"
which is included in RCRA's definition of solid waste. See id. For a discussion of
the use of RCRA's citizen suit provision to recover petroleum-contaminated soil,
including a situation in which RCRA was used to force the clean-up of a petroleum-
contaminated site when CERCLA was not applicable, see MicHAEL M. GmSON, EN-
VIRoNMENTAL REGULATION OF PETROLEUM SPHuS AND WASTES, § 6.3 (1993 & Supp.
1995).
34. Compare CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 with RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972. The CERCLA citizen suit provision provides that "any person may com-
mence a civil action on his own behalf (1) against any person.., who is alleged to
be in violation of any standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order which
has become effective pursuant to [CERCIA]." CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
CERCLA has been described as providing:
an effective mechanism for cleaning up such dangers as quickly as possi-
ble, with as little expense as feasible, and with as much of that expense as
possible borne by the responsible parties, rather than by the taxpayers.
Accordingly, CERCLA included provisions for establishing liability for the
costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites.
Lucia Ann Silecchia, Judicial Review of CERCLA Cleanup Procedures: Striking a Balance
to Prevent Irreparable Harm, 20 HARv. ENmvL. L. REv. 339, 339-40 (1996). For a dis-
cussion of the language used in RCRA's citizen suit provision, see supra notes 25-26
and accompanying text.
35. See CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). Violators of CERCIA
shall be liable for "(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State ... not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan .... " Id. CERCLA also provides for
contribution from others that are liable or potentially liable for violations of CER-
CIA See CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) ("stating [a]ny person may
seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable" for response
costs (emphasis added)); see also Kim Kocher, Note, Recovery of Response Costs Under
CERCLA: A Question of Causation under Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,
Inc., 3 ViL.. ENvrL. L.J. 225, 228-34 (1992) (giving history of CERCLA and discuss-
ing its citizen suits).
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CERCLA includes a statute of limitations for citizen suits while
RCRA contains no such limitation.sm Finally, CERCLA requires the
response costs to be consistent with a "national plan," whereas
RCRA contains no such provision.3 7
D. The Concept of Equitable Restitution
Federal courts have long held that "equitable jurisdiction is not
to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative
command."sm The courts relinquish this traditional jurisdiction
only if congressional language explicitly requires it to do so. 3 9 Fur-
36. See CERCLA §§ 113(g)(2)(A),(B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(g)(2)(A),(B). An
initial action for the costs of liability under CERCLA must be brought within three
years after a removal action, or within six years after the initiation of an on-site
remedial action. See id. Unlike CERCLA, RCRA has no such statute of limitations
for its citizen suit. See RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
37. See CERCILA §§ 107(a) (4) (A),(B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a) (4) (A),(B). CER-
CLA mandates that actions under its citizen suit provisions must be consistent with
the "national contingency plan," as described in section 105. See id. RCRA does
not have a similar provision. See RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
38. Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). In Porter, the Court stated
that "[u] nless a statute in so many words, or by no necessary and inescapable infer-
ence, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is
to be recognized and applied." Id. Porter is the leading case stating the assumption
that federal courts retain all equitable jurisdiction unless Congress specifically lim-
its such power in a statute. See id.
In Porter, the Court held that the provision granting "a permanent or tempo-
rary injunction, restraining order, or other order" gave the district court the ability
to award restitution through its equitable jurisdiction. Id. at 399. The Court
reached this conclusion because restitution, "which lies within ... equitable juris-
diction," does not mean an "award of statutory damages," but instead restores "the
status quo" and "the return of which rightly belongs" to the wronged party. Id. at
402. "'The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be
yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.'" Id. at 398 (quoting Brown
v. Swann, 35 U.S. 497, 503 (1836)); see also Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321
(1944) (holding in favor of courts' exercise of equitable jurisdiction when inter-
preting statutes). The Hecht Court stated that equity was the "instrument for nice
adjustment and reconciliation between ... competing private claims. We do not
believe that such a major departure from that long tradition ... should be lightly
implied." Id. at 329-30; see also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313
(1982) (holding "Congress may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the
court's discretion, but we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to
depart from the established principles").
Courts have looked to RCRA's language in order to determine congressional
intent on this matter. See genera!!y Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 25
(1989) (interpreting RCRA by looking to language of statute itself); see Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("We begin
with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for inter-
preting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed
legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive.").
39. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (holding that usual equitable
remedies were eradicated by language used in statute). Likewise, the Court in
Weinberger stated that Congress, in the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA),
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ther, the United States Supreme Court has held that when Con-
gress creates a private right of action, courts still maintain a
"traditional presumption in favor of all appropriate relief."4° "Ap-
propriate relief" means equitable relief, which may include restitu-
tion, but may not include compensatory damages.41 Although the
difference between restitution and compensatory damages appears
blurred at times, courts have drawn a distinction.42 Therefore, a
"foreclosed the exercise of the usual discretion possessed by a court of equity."
Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313. In TVA, the Court determined that Congress intended
to limit the court's equitable power. See TVA, 437 U.S. at 173. Under ESA, the
federal agencies should "'insure that [their] actions... do not jeopardize the contin-
ued existence' of an endangered species or 'result in the destruction or modifica-
tion of habitat of such species.'" Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)). This
language was explicit enough to pass the Porter standard that a "statute in so many
words... restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity." Porter, 328 U.S. at 398. The
TVA Court found that Congress limited the courts' equitable powers through an
environmental statute. See TVA, 437 U.S. at 153.
40. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 61 (1992) (tracing
history of courts' abilities to allow implied rights of action and fashion equitable
remedies). The Court noted that "from the earliest years of the Republic, the
Court has recognized the power of the Judiciary to award appropriate remedies to
redress injuries actionable in federal court." Id. at 66.
The breadth of equitable restitution is, however, not without some limitations.
See Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (holding
federal district courts have limited powers and cannot be courts of general distinc-
tion). The Court further stated that "federal courts are not courts of general juris-
tiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article HI of the
Constitution." Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).
41. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). The Mertens Court
stated that "'equitable relief can also refer to those categories of relief that were
tpica!/y available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not
compensatory damages)." Id, In Mertens, the Court held that the plaintiffs, who
asked for equitable relief, were really seeking "nothing other than compensatory
damages - monetary relief.... Money Damages are, of course, the classic form of
legal relief." Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
42. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 893 (1988) (stating that "[t]he
fact that a judicial remedy may require one party to pay money to another is not
sufficient reason to characterize the relief as 'money damages'"). In Bowen, the
Court held:
[o]ur cases have long recognized the distinction between an action at law
for damages - which are intended to provide a victim with monetary com-
pensation for an injury to his person, property, or reputation - and an
equitable action for specific relief- which may include an order providing
for.. . "the recovery of specific property or monies .... "
Id. (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688
(1949)).
Restitution may be an appropriate remedy for the proformance of another's
duty without it being considered monetary damages. See RFSrATEMENT OF RESTIT--
TION, §§ 76, 115 (1937). Section 76 states that "[a] person who, in whole or in
part, has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and
another should have been discharged by the other, is entitled to indemnity from
the other." Id. at § 76. Section 115 deals with the performance of another duty to
the pubic, stating that "[a] person who has performed the duty of another by sup-
plying things or services, although acting without the other's knowledge or con-
10
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district court may have the ability to award monetary relief as an
equitable remedy as long as Congress has not explicitly removed a
court's ability to grant resitution.43
E. Development of Case Law
Courts first interpreted RCRA's imminent hazard citizen suit
provision soon after the enactment of section 6972 (a) (1) (B).4
The first case to address the issue of whether a private citizen may
receive restitution for clean-up costs from a liable party was Con.
merme Holding Co. v. Buckstone.4 In Buckstone, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York focused on the
phrase "such other action" as contained in RCRA's citizen suit pro-
vision, concluding that "the statute does not provide a private ac-
tion for damages."46 Buestone sparked a series of decisions which
held that RCRA's citizen suit provision does not allow monetary re-
imbursement for clean-up costs of hazardous waste sites, even when
the plaintiff seeks restitution.4 7
In Cache v. Town of Harision, N.Y,4 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York addressed an issue similar to the one
decided in Buckstone. In Cache, the plaintiff alleged that the Town
sent, is entitled to restitution from the other if... (b) the things or services
supplied were immediately necessary to satisfy the requirements of public decency,
health or safety." Id. at § 115.
43. See Weinberge, 456 US. at 313. The Supreme Court has held that there is
a presumption that Congress is aware of the courts' right to award equitable reme-
dies, and that Congress intends for these remedies, such as restitution, to be al-
lowed absent any statutory language to the contrary. See id. at 313 (citing Hecht
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 329; Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 US. 395, 398
(1946)).
44. See Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., No. CIVA. 88.0120, 1988 WL 120739, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988). In Cobum, a class brought suit against Sun Chemical
for alleged violations of CERCLA and RCRA that caused the contamination of well
water. See id at *1. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were seeking relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a)(1)(A) in their RCRA claim. See id. at *8. The court
stated that section 6972 (a) (1) (B) provides "essentially for injunctive relief and not
remedies for alleged violations of RCRA." Md (emphasis added).
45. See Commerce Holding Co. v. Buckstone, 749 F. Supp. 441 (E.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding that restitutionary damages could not be granted under RCRA).
46. Id at 445. The plaintiff in Buckstone was a landowner who brought suit
against his tenants for costs incurred during the clean-up of the property, resulting
from contamination caused by the hazardous activities of the tenant. See id. at 442-
43. The court stated that although RCRA allowed injunctive relief, it did not grant
the court the power to award monetary damages. See id, at 445.
47. See, eg., Portsmouth Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. BMI Apartments,
847 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Va. 1994); Cache v. Town of Harrison, N.Y., 813 F. Supp.
1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Kaufman and Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 822 F. Supp.
1468 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
48. Cache, 813 F. Supp. at 1045 (holding "RCRA does not authorize a plaintiff
in a citizen suit to recover remediation costs").
1997]
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of Harrison violated RCRA when the town's landfill spread onto the
plaintiff's property.49 In holding that clean-up costs could not be
recovered under RCRA section 6972, the Gache court stated that
RCRA was not intended to permit parties to pursue private
remedies. 0
Soon after the Gache decision, the District Court for the North-
ern Division of California followed the Gache court's lead in Kauf-
man and Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp.51 The plaintiff in Kaufman
brought an action for recovery of clean-up costs under RCRA
against vendors who allegedly generated and buried toxic waste on
the property that the plaintiff had purchased. 52 The Kaufman court
applied the Buckstone court's reasoning and held that RCRA does
not permit parties to pursue private remedies.53 Consequently, the
court found that there was no right to restitution under RCRA's
citizen suit provision.54
Similarly, in Portsmouth Redevelopment & Housing Authority v.
BMI Apartments, the District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia determined whether RCRA's citizen suit provision allowed for
the recovery of money damages for remediation costs.5 In Ports-
49. See id. at 1040. The town never sought permission to use plaintiff's land in
such a way. See id. at 1039.
50. See id. at 1045. The defendant requested summary judgment against the
plaintiff's remediation claim under RCRA. See id. The court granted the defend-
ant's motion, stating that RCRA did not allow reimbursement of cleanup costs. See
id. at 1045 ("To hold otherwise would allow parties to pursue private remedies
rather than acting as private attorney generals. Such was not the intention of
RCRA.").
51. Kaufman & Broad-Smith Bayv. Unisys Corp., 882 F. Supp. 1468 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (holding that RCRA does not create implied private remedy for damages or
restitution).
52. See id. at 1470. The defendants maintained that RCRA section 6972 of-
fered no cause of action for recovery of prior dean-up costs, and therefore moved
for dismissal. See id. at 1476.
53. See id, at 1477. To reach this conclusion, the Kaufman court also looked to
the holding in Walls v. Waste Resource Corp. See id. (citing Wa//s, 761 F.2d 311
(6th Cir. 1985) (holding that there is no private action for damages under
RCRA)). In Walts, the Sixth Circuit found that both RCRA and the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) do not permit the recovery of economic damages
as part of their citizen suit remedies. See Walls, 761 F.2d at 315-16 (holding that
"neither of these provisions [RCRA and FWPCA] expressly permits a private action
for damages"). The Kaufman court also used the Walls holding to support its con-
clusion that section 6972 did not allow a cause of action for restitution. See Kauf-
man, 822 F. Supp. at 1476-77. Finally, the Kaufan court concluded that the Walls
and Buckstone decisions, although not binding, "persuasively argue against imply-
ing a private remedy for damages or restitution." Id. at 1476.
54. See Kauffman, 882 F. Supp. at 1477.
55. See Portamouth Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. BMI Apartments, 847
F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that court lacked power to award monetary
damages for remedial and response costs under RCRA).
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mouth, the defendant incurred costs for cleaning up a hazardous
waste site.m The plaintiff then filed a declaratory judgment action
in order to prevent the defendant from seeking indemnification for
the clean-up costs.5 7 The court held that RCRA does not grant the
court the power to award such indemnification, because RCRA's
citizen suit provision does not allow a plaintiff to be the direct bene-
ficiary of the relief.58
In Furrer v. Brown, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eight Circuit faced a controversy similar to the one decided by the
Portsmouth court.59 In Furrer, the plaintiff owned contaminated
property previously owned and occupied by a Shell Oil service sta-
tion.6o After the Missouri Department of Natural Resources or-
dered the plaintiffs to remediate the contamination, the plaintiffs
brought suit in federal court under RCRA section 6872 to recover
remediation costs from the defendants. 6'
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit decided whether it could award
monetary damages for the costs of cleaning up a site contaminated
with petroleum under RCRA's citizen suit provision.62 In Furrer, the
56. See id. at 382-83.
57. See id. at 383. The defendants asserted counterclaims against the plaintiffs
under RCRA's citizen suit provision. See id. BMI asserted that section 6972 allowed
for an order of restitution for "'the money [BMI] has expended and will expend in
the future ... for all actions necessary to investigate, assess, or abate'" the violation
of RCRA. Id.
58. See id. at 385. The court looked to the language of section 6972 (a) (1) (B)
to decide if RCRA mandates an award for past and present monetary damages. See
id. For a discussion of the language of § 6972(a) (1) (B), see supra note 25 and
accompanying text. The court found that section 6972 does not allow for such a
remedy. See Portsmouth, 847 F. Supp. at 385. "In asking to award money damages
for 'remedial and response costs' . . . BMI is asking for relief that is beyond the
powers of the district court to grant under the citizens-suit provision of RCRA,
which only allows claims by parties 'acting as private attorneys-general rather than
[those] pursuing a private remedy....'" Id. (citing Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc., v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983)).
59. See Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092 (1995) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that
RCRA allows for implied cause of action to recover remediation costs under
RCRA's citizen suit provision). For a discussion of Furrer, and an examination of
the differences between Funrer and the Ninth Circuit's holding in KFc, see J.
Thomas Blaine, Note, The RCRA Citzen Suit Provision and the Private Remedy of Restitu-
tion After KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig and Funrer v. Brown: Reasonable Minds May
Differ, 11 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 155 (1995-96); see also Krista McIntyre,
RCRA: Circuits Conflict on PAivate-Party Cost Recovery, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 58
(1996).
60. See Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1093. The defendants previously owned the property
and had leased it to Shell Oil Company to operate a service station. See Id.
61. See id. (citing Complaint at para. 16, Furrer v. Brown, No. 4:93-CV-2276
(E.D. Mo. filed Oct. 22, 1993)).
62. See id. The district court had held that it did not have subject matter juris-
diction over a federal claim and refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
other state law claims that had been made by the plaintiffs. See id. Because the
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plaintiffs argued that section 6972 permitted the court to award
money damages as a form of equitable restitution. 63 Rejecting this
argument, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
holding that Congress had not implicitly created a monetary rem-
edy and that such an award had not become part of federal com-
mon law.64 This holding was consistent with other lower courts'
dismissal was granted without reference to anything outside the pleadings, the
Eight Circuit heard the appeal as a question of law de novo. See id The Eight
Circuit looked to the language of section 6972, stating that the section gave subject
matter jurisdiction to citizen suits when the equitable remedies sought were the
following:
prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief "to enforce," "to restrain," and
"to order... other... action... necessary." The statute does not give the
district court the express authority in citizen suits to award money judg-
ments for costs incurred in cleaning up contaminated sites. Thus, if such
a remedy is to be available, we must find that Congress . . . implicitly
created such a remedy, or that the "cause of action ... may become a part
of the federal common law through the exercise ofjudicial power to fash-
ion appropriate remedies for unlawful conduct."
Id. at 1094 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
63. See id. at 1095. The Furrers argued that the language "to order.., such
other action as may be necessary" was a clear example of Congress's intent to leave
to the courts their traditional ability to use equitable remedies. Id.
64. See id. The Eighth Circuit examined Congress's intent when passing
RCRA to decide if the citizen suit provision contained a cause of action for mone-
tary reimbursement for the cleanup of hazardous sites. See id. at 1094-95. Using
the test set forth in Coil v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), to determine if Congress in-
tended to create this remedy, the court used four factors to determine whether
RCRA authorized an implied cause of action:
(1) Is the plaintiff in the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted?
(2) Does the legislative history explicitly or implicitly show an intent to
create or deny the cause of action?
(3) Is the proposed remedy within the context and purpose of the statu-
tory scheme?
(4) Is the matter traditionally a matter of state law, making an inferred
federal remedy inappropriate?
Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1094-95 (citing Cort 422 U.S. at 95).
The Furrer court held that the Furrers were members of the intended class. See
id. at 1095. However, the court found that the Furrers were not entitled to any
"special benefit" under RCRA because they were the owners of property that was
contaminated through no fault of their own. See id. The court stated that it could
be argued that the Furrers were "in a class of persons that RCRA and § 6972
[were] directed against-the owners of a storage facility where hazardous waste
has presented an imminent and substantial endangerment." Id. The court con-
trasted RCRA's citizen suit provision, which does not provide for contribution,
from other liable sources with CERCLA's citizen suit provision, which does provide
for contribution from any other liable parties. See id. at 1096 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f) (1) (1994)). Looking to the legislative history of RCRA and its amend-
ments, the Eight Circuit found that there was "no evidence that Congress intended
to create such a remedy." Id. As to the third part of the Cort test, the court de-
cided that "RCRA's goal is to prevent the creation of hazardous waste sites, rather
than to promote the cleanup of existing sites," and the purposes of RCRA would
not be served by providing for a monetary remedy under section 6972. Id. at 1098.
Looking at the fourth and final part of the Coil test, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that this factor provided no basis for recovery of clean-up costs. See id. at 1099.
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interpretation of the citizen suit provision of RCRA.65 Nonetheless,
one week prior to the Furrer court's decision, the Ninth Circuit in
KFC contradicted these decisions by allowing a recovery for clean-
up costs. 66
III. FACTS
In 1975, KFC purchased real property in Los Angeles from
Alan and Margaret Meghrig, and thereafter opened and operated a
KFC restaurant on the site.67 In 1988, during construction on the
property, KFC discovered that soil under and around the restaurant
was contaminated with petroleum.68 The soil became contami-
nated as a result of the presence of leaking underground storage
tanks.69 The Los Angeles County Department of Health Services
ordered KFC to clean up the site. 70
To remedy the situation, KFC spent $211,000 to remove and
dispose of the hazardous soil.71 In 1992, KFC brought suit under
RCRA's citizen suit provision, seeking to recover clean-up costs
from the Meghrigs. 72 The district court held that section 6972(a)
does not permit recovery of prior clean-up costs, and also that sec-
65. For a discussion of other courts' interpetations of section 6972, see supra
notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
66. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's holding in KFC, see infra note 74
and accompanying text.
67. Petitioner's Brief at *4, Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 1995 WL 668003
(U.S. 1996) (No. 95-83).
68. SeeMeghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1253 (1996).
69. Respondent's Brief at *2, Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 1995 WL 728551
(1996) (No. 95-83). The Meghrigs owned the property for 12 years before selling
it to KFC in 1975. See id. at *4. Prior owners and/or their lessees operated a gas
station on the property for 45 years. See id. The presence of petroleum also caused
lead and benzene to accumulate in the soil. See id. at *2.
70. See KFr, 116 S. Ct. at 1253. The Los Angeles Department of Building and
Safety issued a stop order on all construction on the property until a clearance was
issued by the Los Angles Department of Health Services. See Respondent's Brief at
*2, Meghrig (No. 95-83).
71. See iKC, 116 S. Ct. at 1253. In an effort to obtain clearance from the
Department of Health Services, KFC began soil remediation work, which was com-
pleted in March, 1989. See Respondent's Brief at *2, Meghrig (No. 95-83). Upon
clean-up, the Department of Health Services issued a formal clearance. See id. The
Meghrigs were unaware of the clean-up until well after the clean-up was com-
pleted. See Petitioner's Brief at *5, Meghrig (No. 95-83).
72. See KR?, 116 S. Ct. at 1253. For a discussion of the language used in
RCRA's citizen suit provision, see supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. KFC
claimed that the suit fell under RCRA because the contaminated soil was "solid
waste" as described in RCRA; that the soil posed an "imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or environment"; and that the Meghrigs contributed to
the soil's "past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dispo-
sal." i27C 116 S. Ct. at 1253.
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tion 6972(a) (1) (B) does not grant the district court the power to
award remediation for toxic waste that does not pose an "'immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment'
at the time the suit is filed."75 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district court's decision, holding that RCRA entitled KFC
to recover restitution for clean-up costs. 74
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of RCRA, as well as the split between the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits over the interpretation of RCRA's citizen
suit provision. 75 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision,
holding that section 6972 does not authorize a private cause of ac-
tion to recover the prior costs of cleaning up toxic waste that is not
an endangerment to health or the environment at the time of
suit.7 6
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In KA, the Court addressed the issue of whether RCRA's citi-
zen suit provision authorizes a private action to recover the prior
cost of cleaning up toxic waste that does not, at the time of suit,
pose an endangerment to health or the environment 77 In denying
the right to a private action for prior clean-up costs, the Court fo-
cused on the following factors: (1) the differences between the
purposes of RCRA and CERCIA; (2) the requirements of RCRA's
citizen suit provision-timing and remedies; (3) RCRA's enforce-
73. Id. The Meghrigs moved to dismiss KFC's complaint for failure to state a
claim, stating that KFC failed to allege that an "imminent and substantial endan-
germent" existed at the time of the complaint, and that a request for monetary
relief was beyond the remedies provided by in RCRA's citizen suit provision. See
Respondent's Brief at *4, Meghrig (No. 95-83). The district court held that both
grounds for dismissal were valid and dismissed KFC's complaint. See KFC, 116 S.
CL at 1253.
74. See KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (1995). The Ninth Circuit
found that the district court did have authority under section 6972(a) to award
restitution damages for dean-up costs. See id. at 521-23. The Ninth Circuit also
held that a private party can proceed with a suit under section 6972(a) (1) (B) be-
cause the waste "presented an imminent and substantial endangerment at the time
it was cleaned up[.]" KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1253 (emphasis added).
75. See KFC at 1251. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of
RCRA's citizen suit in Furrer, see supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
76. See KF, 116 S. Ct. at 1254-56.
77. See id. The Ninth Circuit held that RCRA's citizen suit provision author-
ized an award of restitution of past clean-up costs, and that a party can proceed
with a cause of action under section 6972(a)(1)(B) when the waste removed
presented an "imminent and substantial endangerment" at the time of dean-up.
KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 520-21. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether
this was the proper interpretation of RCRA. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1253.
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ment scheme; and (4) the availability of equitable remedies under
RcRA.78
A. Differences Between Purposes of RCRA and CERCLA
The Court began its analysis of RCRA's citizen suit provision by
comparing the purpose of RCRA with the purpose of CERCLA.v9
The Court noted that RCRA does not compensate for the clean-up
of hazardous wastes, as is the case with CERCLA, because RCRA's
purpose is to prevent the disposal of hazardous wastes, while CER-
CLA's purpose is to facilitate the prompt clean-up of existing haz-
ardous waste sites.80 Accordingly, the Court determined that RCRA
is not intended to force the clean-up of hazardous waste or to com-
pensate those who have participated in the clean-up of hazardous
waste.8 '
78. See id. at 1254-56. For a discussion of the Court's interpretation of the
differences between the purposes of RCRA and CERCLA, see infta notes 79-81 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the Court's interpretation of RCRA's and
CERCA's timing and remedies, see infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of the Court's interpretation of RCRA's enforcement scheme, see infra
notes 93-100 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of
the availability of equitable remedies under RCRA, see infra notes 101-05 and ac-
companying text.
79. See KFC 116 S. Ct. at 1254. The Court stated that RCRA's primary pur-
pose is to reduce "the generation of hazardous waste," and that hazardous waste
that is generated should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as "to minimize the
present and future threat to human health and the environment." Id. (citing 42
U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1994)). Conversely, CERCLA's dual purposes are "'prompt
clean-up of hazardous waste sites and imposition of all clean-up costs on the re-
sponsible party.'" Id. (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys.,
Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990)).
80. See id. The Court characterized RCRA as being " [u]nlike CERCLA," and
further stated that RCRA could not be interpreted as similar to CERCLA. See id.
81. See id. at 1256. When it discussed RCRA's citizen suit provision, the Court
pointed out that the EPA Administrator has primary responsibility for RCRA's en-
orcement. See id. at 1254 ("Chief responsibility for the implementation and en-
forcement of RCRA rests with the Administrator.") (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928,
6973).
During the oral argument of this case, the United States, as amicus curiae, ar-
gued that Congress intended that RCRA would "encourage the responsible party
to clean up the site and eliminate the need for a suit." Oral Argument at *30,
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 1996 WL 14515 (1996) (No. 95-83). "Congress does
not simply [wish] to see that the sites [are] cleaned up. They're also interested in
seeing that the responsible parties would bear those expenses." I& The Court
dismissed the government's characterization of RCRA, answering "[n]ot in this
statute." Id.
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B. Requirements of RCRA's Citizen Suit Provision-Timing and
Remedies
In determining whether to allow KFC to recover restitution
damages the Court looked to the sections of RCRA's citizen suit
provision which provide the requirements for the timing of the citi-
zen suit8 2 and available remedies.83 Based on the statute's plain
language, the Court noted that RCRA's timing provision allows pri-
vate actions only if the hazardous waste in question presents an "im-
minent" danger to health or the environment.8 4 The Court
construed the plain meaning of the term "imminent" to mean
"threatening to occur immediately."85 The Court also decided that
the term "imminent" is controlling, and therefore, RCRA's citizen
suit provision does not allow a remedy for the cost of prior clean-
ups of hazardous waste. 86 Thus, the Court concluded that RCRA's
citizen suit provision does not cover reparation for past clean-up
costs.
8 7
82. See RCRA §§ 3008, 7003, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6973 (stating "the first [re-
quirement] concerns the necessary timing of the citizen suit brought under
§ 6972(a) (1) (B)"). For further discussion of RCRA's citizen suit provision's timing
requirements, see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
83. See KFC 116 S. Ct. at 1254 (providing that "[tlhe second [requirement]
defines the remedies a district court can award in a suit brought under
§ 6972 (a) (1) (B)"). For a discussion of the remedies provided by RCRA's citizen
suit provision, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
84. See KG, 116 S. Ct. at 1255. The Court emphasized that "imminent" was
the controlling term in the citizen suit provision. See id. The Court wrote that the
citizen suit provision "permits a private party to bring suit against certain responsi-
ble persons [for their dealings with] any solid or hazardous waste which may present
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." Id.
85. See id. The Court applied the Webster's Dictionary definition of the term
imminent. Id. ("The meaning of this timing restriction is plain: [a]n endanger-
ment can only be 'imminent' if it 'threaten [s] to occur immediately .... '") (citing
WEBSTrER'S INTERNATIONAL DICIONAYm or ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1245 (2d ed. 1934)).
The Court then stated that RCRA's use of the term "may present" further pre-
cludes any action for past clean-ups. See id. (stating "may present" imminent harm
clearly excludes waste that no longer presents a danger). The Court looked to the
Ninth Circuit which noted that "may present. . . 'implies that there must be a
threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until
later.'" Id. (emphasis added). The Court, however, also criticized the Ninth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of the phrase "imminent endangerment," stating that such an
interpretation "represents a novel application of federal statutory law." Id. at 1255.
86. See -KFt, 116 S. Ct. at 1255. The fact that "RCRA's citizen suit provision
was not intended to provide a remedy for past clean-up costs is ... apparent from
the harm at which it is directed." Id.
87. See id. The Court concluded that RCRA's citizen suit provision "was
designed to provide a remedy that ameliorates present or obviates the risk of fu-
ture 'imminent' harms, not a remedy that compensates for past clean-up efforts."
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).
[Vol. VIII: p. 627
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Next, the Court looked to the remedies available under
RCRA's citizen suit provision in order to determine whether an in-
dividual could bring an action for compensation of past clean-up
costs.88 The Court noted that the statute's remedial scheme does
not allow awards for compensation of past clean-ups,89 because
RCRA's remedial scheme only allows for remedies such as
mandatory or prohibitory injunctions.90 The Court further noted
that if Congress intended RCRA's citizen suit provision to allow ad-
ditional remedies, it would have used language similar to that used
in CERCLA's citizen suit provision. 9' Finally, the Court concluded
that because Congress did not provide the same remedies in both
RCRA's and CERCLA's citizen suit provisions, RCRA does not per-
mit the court to award prior clean-up costs.92
88. See id. at 1254. The Court stressed that RCRA's citizen suit provision pro-
vided two remedies: "to restrain any person who [is or has dealt with] any solid or
hazardous waste .... to order such a person to take such other action as may be necessary,
or both." Id.
89. See id. "It is apparent from the two remedies described [the court's ability
to restrain and to order] that RCRA's citizen suit provision is not directed at pro-
viding compensation for past clean-up efforts." Id.
90. See id. Specifically, the Court noted that RCRA provides: "[a] private citi-
zen ... could seek a mandatory injunction [that makes the responsible party take
action] ... or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one that 'restrains' a responsible party
from further violating RCRA." Id. For a discussion of traditional injunctive reme-
dies, see ENrRoNMErNTAL PROTECrION, supra note 26, at §§ 8 [8] [b] [iii], [iv]; see
also Mux.R, supra note 2, at § 8.1 (giving common law background, defining
prohibatory, mandatory and statutory injunctions, and discussing injunctive forms
of relief).
91. See /OT, 116 S. Ct. at 1254. The Court found the comparison between
RCRA and CERCLA's citizen suit remedies "telling." Id. The Court stated that
CERCLA addresses many of the same problems that RCRA addresses, and because
the two statutes are similar, Congress intended the differences between the statutes
to be truly different. See id. at 1254-55. The Court pointed out that while CER-
CLA's citizen suit provision is similar to RCRA's citizen suit provision, CERCLA's
different remedies demonstrate that RCRA cannot be interpreted in the same
manner. See id. at 1255. CERCLA "expressly permits the recovery of any 'necessary
costs of response incurred by any.. . person consistent with the national contin-
gency plan.'" Id. (citing CERCILA § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B)).
For a discussion of section 9607(a) (4) (B), see supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
Further, CERCA "also provides that '[a]ny person may seek contribution
from any other person who is liable or potentially liable' for those response costs."
KMt 116 S. Ct. at 1255 (citing CERCLA § 113(0 (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0 (1)). For a
discussion of section 9613(f) (1), see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
92. See Kr, 116 S. Ct. at 1255. "Congress has thus demonstrated in CERCLA
that it knew how to provide for the recovery of clean-up costs, and that the lan-
guage used to define the remedies under RCRA does not provide that remedy."
Id.
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C. RCRA's Enforcement Scheme
The Court also examined the enforcement scheme of RCRA's
citizen suit provision to determine if it permits compensation for
the prior clean-up of hazardous waste. 93 The Court looked to
RCRA's lack of a statute of limitations, comparing it to CERCLA's
enforcement scheme which does contain a statute of limitations.94
Additionally, the Court noted that RCRA does not require that the
relief sought be reasonable, while CERCLA's citizen suit provision
does require that the recovery sought be reasonable.95 Moreover,
the Court found that the absence of these features in RCRA, but
present in CERCLA, would be illogical if Congress had intended to
allow actions for recovery of clean-up costs under RCRA's citizen
suit provision.96
The Court continued its analysis by focusing on the require-
ments an individual must meet to bring an action against another
person under RCRA's citizen suit provision.97 The Court found
that the ninety-day advance notice requirement is evidence that
RCRA's citizen suit provision does not allow for the recovery of past
clean-up costs.98 Also, the Court noted that RCRA's provision bar-
ring a suit by an individual if an action has been brought by the
EPA Administrator or a state provides further support for its deci-
93. See id.
94. See id. "Unlike CERCLA, RCRA contains no statute of limitations." Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 9 6 13 (g)(2)). For a discussion of CERCIA's statute of limita-
tions for citizen suits, see supra note 36 and accompanying text. RCRA has no
statute of limitation in its citizen suit provision. See RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972
(1994).
95. See K1C, 116 S. Ct. at 1255 (stating RCRA's citizen suit provision "does not
require a showing that the response costs being sought are reasonable," and not-
ing that costs recovered through CERCIA's citizen suit provision must be reason-
able by being consistent "with the national contingency plan" described in 42
U.S.C. § 9605).
96. See id. at 1255. "If Congress had intended [RCRA's citizen suit] to func-
tion as a cost-recovery mechanism, the absence of these provisions would be strik-
ing." Id.
97. See id.
98. See RCRA § 7002 (b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (2). The Court described
the provision as stating that "a private party may not bring suit ... without first
giving 90 days' notice to the Administrator of the EPA, to 'the State in which the
alleged endangerment may occur,' and to the potential defendants." Kr 116 S.
Ct. at 1255 (citing RCRA §§ 7002(b) (2) (A) (i-iii), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972 (b) (2) (A) (i-
iii)). For a discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (2) (A), see supra note 29 and accom-
panying text. The Court also pointed out the single exception to the notice re-
quirement for the citizen suit, but stressed that it was a "limited exception." KFt
116 S. Ct. at 1255 (citing Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1989)
(stating that notice requirement is waived "when there is a danger that hazardous
waste will be discharged")).
20
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sion.99 The Court concluded that these provisions show that prior
clean-up costs cannot be awarded under RCRA's citizen suit
provision.1 00
D. Equitable Remedies
Finally, the Court considered the issue of whether Congress in-
tended that district courts be able to award clean-up costs under the
principle of equitable remedy. 10 1 The Court stated that Congress
did not intend "for a private citizen to be able to undertake a clean
up and then recover its costs under RCRA."102 Further, the Court
held that because Congress provided remedies in RCRA, the Court
could not read other "equitable" remedies into RCRA.1 03 Conclud-
ing its analysis, the Court stated that an "'elemental cannon of stat-
99. See RCRA §§ 7002 (b)(2)(B),(C), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(b) (2) (B),(C). "[N]o
citizen suit may proceed if either the EPA or the State has commenced, or is dili-
gently prosecuting, a separate enforcement action." KFa, 116 S. Ct. at 1255 (citing
RCRA §§ 7002(b)(2)(B),(C), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(b)(2)(B),(C)). For a discussion
of §§ 6972(b) (2) (B),(C), see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
100. See K/C 116 S. Ct. at 1255. The Court concluded:
[i]f RCRA were designed to compensate private parties for their past
clean-up efforts, it would be a wholly irrational mechanism for doing so.
Those parties with insubstantial problems, problems that neither the
State nor the Federal Government feel compelled to address, could re-
cover their response costs, whereas those parties whose waste problems
were sufficiently severe as to attract the attention of Government officials
would be left without a recovery.Id.
101. See id. at 1255-56. In an amicus brief, the Government argued in support
of KFC's claim that the Court could grant equitable remedies under RCRA's citi-
zen suit provision. See id. "Echoing a similar argument made by KFC . . . the
Government does not rely on the remedies expressly provided for in § 6972(a),
but rather cites a line of cases holding that district courts retain inherent authority
to award any equitable remedy that is not expressly taken away from them by Con-
gress." Id. (citing Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967);
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321 (1944)). For a discussion of the concept of equitable remedy or restitution,
see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
102. KRC 116 S. Ct. at 1256. The Court stated that "the limited remedies
described in § 6972(a), along with the stark differences between the language of
that section and the cost recovery provisions of CERCLA, amply" show that there
was no intent to provide for recovery of clean-up costs. Id. The Court pointed out
that RCRA protects an individual's right to bring suit for recovery of hazardous
waste clean-up costs "under other federal or state laws." Id. (citing RCRA
§ 7002(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f)). For a discussion of § 6972(f), see supra note 24
and accompanying text.
103. Id. "[W] here Congress has provided 'elaborate enforcement provisions'
for remedying the violation of a federal statute, as Congress has done with RCRA
and CERCLA, 'it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by impli-
cation additional judicial remedies for private citizens suing under' the statute."
Id. (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981)).
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utory construction [is] that where a statute expressly provides a
particular remedy or remedies, a court must be wary of reading
others into it.'-104
In KAF, the Supreme Court concluded that RCRA's citizen suit
provision does not authorize a private cause of action to recover the
prior cost of cleaning up toxic waste that is not an endangerment to
health or the environment at the time of the suit.105 Further discus-
sion of the differences between the purposes and language of
RCRA and CERCLA, RCRA's remedies requirements, RCRA's en-
forcement scheme, and the availability of equitable remedies under
RCRA is necessary to determine if the United States Supreme Court
has reached the proper conclusion.
V. CRITCAL ANALYSIS
In KFC, the Court determined whether RCRA's citizen suit pro-
vision allows claimants to bring suits for the cost of a prior clean-up
of hazardous waste that did not present an endangerment to
human health or the environment at the time the suit was
brought. 10 6 Ultimately, the Court held that RCRA's citizen suit pro-
vision does not provide a remedy for the cost of a prior clean-up of
hazardous waste. 10 7 By analyzing the Court's opinion in conjunc-
tion with RCRA, CERCIA, and the concept of equitable restitution,
it is clear that the Court's holding was correct, although the Court's
reasoning was somewhat imprecise.
104. Id. at 1256 (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 19 (1979)).
105. The Court concluded:
[s]ection 6972(a) does not contemplate the award of past clean-up cost,
and § 6972 (a) (1) (B) permits a private party to bring suit only upon an
allegation that the contaminated site presently poses an 'imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment,' and not upon
the allegation that it posed such an endangerment at some time in the
past.
Id. The Court was careful to note that it had not decided "whether a private party
could seek to obtain an injunction requiring another party to pay dean-up costs
which arise after a RCRA citizen suit has been properly commenced, or otherwise
recover dean-up costs paid out after the invocation of RCRA's statutory process."
Id. (citation omitted).
106. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1254-56.
107. See id.
22
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A. Differences Between Purposes of RCRA and CERCLA
The Court began its inquiry into the meaning of RCRA's citi-
zen suit by comparing RCRA's purpose with CERCLA's purpose. 108
The Court defined the purpose of RCRA, by first differentiating the
purposes of RCRA and CERCLA, 10 9 and only then looking to the
definition of RCRA provided by the statute itself.n0 By defining
RCRA's purpose in this manner, the Court strayed from the canon
of statutory construction that courts must first look to the plain lan-
guage of the statute to find a statute's meaning."' By referring to
CERCLA at the outset, the Court's analysis implies that RCRA is not
clear on the issue of recovery of past clean-up costs through equita-
ble restitution." 2
By comparing the two acts, the Court highlighted that Con-
gress intended to use RCRA as a tool for the prevention of hazard-
108. See id. at 1254. For a discussion of the purposes of RCRA and CERCLA,
see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
109. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1254. The Court first reiterated its own definition
of RCRA's purpose that it had provided in Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,
stating "RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute that governs the treat-
ment, storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste." Id. (citing Chicago v.
Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 334-35 (1994)). Relying on this defi-
nition, the KFC Court defined RCRA as "unlike" CERCLA. See id. at 1254.
110. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1994)). The opening provision of
RCRA provides a clear definition of its purpose. See RCRA § 1002(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6902(b). This section states "Congress hereby declares it to be the national pol-
icy of the United States that .... [w] aste ... should be treated, stored, or disposed
of so as to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the envi-
ronment." Id.
The Court presumed that RCRA can be understood only by comparing it to
CERCLA. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1254. This presumption is the basis for the Court's
first argument that RCRA does not allow recovery for past clean-up costs. See id.
The Court used this presumption as evidence for its other arguments throughout
the opinion. See id. For examples of the Court's comparison of RCRA to CERCLA
in order for the Court to interpret RCRA, see supra notes 79-81, 91-92, and 94-96
and accompanying text.
111. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 25 (1989); Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
112. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. The Court used CERCLA
as a rosetta stone for the understanding of RCRA throughout its decision. See A
116 S. Ct. at 1251. Although the Meghrigs acknowledged that RCRA was clear on
its face, they looked to CERCLA to determine whether RCRA permitted the court
to award monetary damages. See Petitioner's Brief at *22, Meghrig v. KFC Western,
Inc., 1995 WL 668003 (1996) (No. 95-83) (arguing that "[a] comparison of the
RCRA citizen suit provision with comparable provisions in CERCLA reaffirms the
absence of a cost recovery authorization in RCRA"). The Court agreed with the
Meghrigs and used CERCLA as a way of defining what remedies RCRA allowed.
See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1252. For a discussion of the concept of equitable remedies,
see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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ous waste and the clean-up of hazardous waste that exists,113 rather
than the imposition of clean-up costs on responsible parties.11 4 In
doing so, the Court missed the opportunity to determine the pur-
pose of RCRA by looking to the plain language of RCRA's citizen
suit provision. 15 Because the language of RCRA's citizen suit provi-
sion supports the argument that this provision does not allow for
the imposition of past clean-up costs on responsible parties, it
would have been more appropriate for the Court to base its primary
argument on the statutory language of RCRA's citizen suit
provision. 116
113. For a discussion of the purposes of RCRA, see supra notes 16-18 and
accompanying text. The Court did not look to any legislative history as it defined
the purposes of RCRA, because RCRA's legislative history is silent on the recovery
of monetary damages for past clean-ups of hazardous waste. See H.R. REP. No. 98-
198, at 53 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 5576, 5612 (noting that RCRA
"confers on citizens a limited right... to sue to abate an imminent and substantial
endangerment"). The use of the word "abate" is not compelling enough to deter-
mine congressional intent. See City of Chicago, 511 U.S. at 337 (quoting Court of
Appeals, which asked "[w] hy should we ... rely on a single word in a committee
report that did not result in legislation? Simply put, we shouldn't."). The KFC
Court disregarded the committee report, noting "it is the statute, and not the
Committee Report, which is the authoritative expression of the law .... " Id, at
1593. For a discussion of the legislative history behind RCRA's citizen suit provi-
sion, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
114. See KF, 116 S. Ct. at 1254 (noting that RCRA authorizes courts "to re-
strain" or "to order," but not to impose clean-up costs on responsible parties). For
further discussion of RCRA's "restrain" and "order" provisions, see supra note 26
and accompanying text.
115. Although the Court was able to show RCRA's purpose by examining
CERCLA, it could have proven this point by using the statutory language of
RCRA's citizen suit provision, which is not consistent with the principle of equita-
ble restitution. This would have prevented the Court from highlighting the differ-
ences between RCRA and CERCLA as its primary argument. For a further
discussion of why the language of RCRA is inconsistent with the principles of equi-
table restitution, see supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
116. A better analysis would have been for the Court to begin its opinion by
showing that the language of the citizen suit provision states that the "district court
shall have jurisdiction.., to restrain any person.., to order such person to take
such other action as may be necessary, or both." RCRA § 7002 (a) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972 (a) (1)(B) (1994). This language clearly defeats KFC's contention that the
citizen suit provision allows for equitable restitution. See Respondent's Brief at *11,
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 1995 .WL 728551 (1996) (No. 95-83) (presenting
KFC's erroneous argument that RCRA's citizen suit provision authorizes equitable
restitution). This argument would have enabled the Court to reject the respon-
dents' claim while adhering to the canon of statutory construction which requires
courts to look to the language of the statute to derive its meaning. See Hallstrom v.
Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 25 (1989) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). The Court, however, chose to
postpone this part of its analysis until after it discussed CERCLA. For a discussion
of the KFC Court's analysis, see supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
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B. Requirements of RCRA's Citizen Suit Provision -
Timing and Remedies
The Court then examined the language of RCRA's citizen suit
provision to determine whether KFC's claim for equitable restitu-
tion was allowed under RCRA.117 Unfortunately, the Court did not
take the opportunity at that stage to fully clarify the legal issues
under RCRA. Rather, in its analysis, the Court combined the sepa-
rate issues of timing and remedies available under RCRA, whereas
either issue alone would have defeated KFC's claim for
compensation.118
The Court briefly mentioned the timing requirement and then
examined the availability of compensation as a remedy under
RCRA's citizen suit provision.11 9 While finding that RCRA does not
allow for recovery of past clean-up costs, the Court blurred the dis-
117. See KF, 116 S. Ct. at 1254. The Court stated that the "[t]wo require-
ments of § 6972(a) defeat KFC's suit against the Meghrigs." Id. These two require-
ments are "timing" and "remedies available." Id. For a discussion of the timing
requirement under RCRA's citizen suit provision, see supra notes 27-30 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the remedies available under RCRA's citizen suit
provision, see supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. The Court should have
determined RCRA's purpose by examining RCRA's statutory language rather than
by looking to CERCLA to do so.
118. The Court stated that the "necessary timing" requirement defeats KFC's
claim. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1254. Next, the Court held that the remedies available
under RCRA's citizen suit provision defeated KFC's claim. Id. The Court then
returned to the timing requirement of RCRA and stated that the plain meaning of
the requirement barred any past clean-up costs. See id. at 1255.
KFC's claim for equitable restitution failed both the timing and remedies re-
quirements separately. The Court should have made it clear that future claims
will also fail if they do not meet both requirements, independent of each other. By
combining the two requirements together and dealing with them interchangeably,
the Court has de-emphasized the need for claims to meet both the requirement
that the suit be timely and the requirement that the plaintiffs claim seeks a remedy
available under RCRA's citizen suit provision. See id. at 1254-55.
119. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1254. The Court used "a plain reading of the reme-
dial scheme" of the statute to conclude that RCRA has only two remedies available
under RCRA's citizen suit provision: mandatory injunctions and prohibitory in-
junctions. See id. at 1254. For a discussion of the Court's interpretation of the
remedies available under RCRA's citizen suit provision, see supra notes 88-92 and
accompanying text.
This conclusion is properly based on the canon of statutory construction that
a court must look to the plain meaning of the statute's language. See KFC, 116 S.
Ct. at 1256. If the Court had followed KFC's line of reasoning that the language,
"take such other action as may be necessary," permitted the court to provide equi-
table restitution, it would have violated this canon, because this remedy does not
fall under the remedial scheme provided in the language of RCRA's citizen suit
rovision. See Respondent's Brief at *19, Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 1995 WL
2551 (1996) (No. 95-83) (stating that phrase "such other action as may be neces-
sary... embraces an order for restitutionary relief").
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tinction between damages and equitable restitution. 120 This dis-
tinction, however, is unimportant because the Court made it clear
that neither damages nor equitable restitution are allowed under
RCRA's citizen suit provision. 12 1 Moreover, while examining the
availability of a remedy, the Court again used CERCLA to define
RCRA, rather than solely relying on the language of RCRA to defeat
KFC's claim.' 22 Using this telling comparison, the Court was able
to clearly show that Congress did not intend for RCRA to provide
for the recovery of clean-up costs. 123 However, the Court could
have made a stronger argument by concluding that even though
the 1984 amendments to RCRA's citizen suit provision came after
CERCLA's citizen suit provision, Congress chose not to implement
the already existing language of CERCLA. 124
120. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1254. The Court chose to ignore the distinctions
that KFC had made between its request for equitable restitution and a request for
damages, stating that the citizen suit provision's remedies do not "contemplate the
award of past clean-up costs, whether these are denominated 'damages' or 'equita-
ble restitution.'" Id. This refusal to separate the two remedies derailed KFC's ar-
gument that the Court could use its equitable jurisdiction to award equitable relief.
For a discussion of KFC's argument that equitable restitution is not damages, see
supra note 101 and accompanying text. It is doubtful, however, that the Court
would have agreed with KFC's distinction between equitable restitution and money
damages because KFC's original complaint sought money damages, and only after
amending its claim did KFC characterize the relief it sought as "equitable restitu-
tion." See Respondent's Brief at *3-*4, Meghrig (No. 95-83); Petitioner's Brief at *6,
Meghrig v. KFC Western, 1995 WL 668003 (1996) (No. 95-83) (1995). For a dis-
cussion of the proceedings in the district court, see supra note 73 and accompany-
ing text.
121. As the -Court stated, only mandatory injunctions or prohibitory injunc-
tions are allowed by RCRA's citizen suit provision. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1254. For
a discussion of the Court's holding on the remedies available under RCRA's citizen
suit provision, see supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
122. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1254-55. The Court clearly stated that the language
of the citizen suit provision does not allow for monetary compensation, but used a
comparison with CERCLA as the foundation for this finding. See id. For a discus-
sion of the differences between the citizen suit provisions in RCRA and CERCLA,
see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
123. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1254-55 (stating that CERCLA demonstrated that
"Congress... knew how to provide for the recovery of clean-up costs, and that the
language used to define remedies under RCRA does not provide that remedy").
For a discussion of the Court's use of CERCLA to show that RCRA does not pro-
vide for the recovery of clean-up costs, see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying
text.
124. The Court noted that "CERCLA was passed several years after RCRA
went into effect." KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1254. The Court used this time frame to show
that Congress knew of RCRA's citizen suit provision, but decided that different
language was needed to allow the remedy for recovery of clean-up costs in CER-
CIA. See id. For a discussion of the Court's argument, see supra note 96 and ac-
companying text. Although this argument is persuasive, the fact that Congress
amended RCRA's citizen suit provision after it was passed is more compelling. For
a discussion of the 1984 amendments to RCRA, see supra notes 25-26 and accom-
panying text. More clearly, the fact that Congress included a very comprehensive
26
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The Court then returned to RCRA's timing requirement-1 25
The Court properly focused on the need for the hazardous waste to
pose an "immediate endangerment" in order to meet RCRA's citi-
zen suit timing provision.' 26 The Court's use of a plain meaning
definition of the term "imminent," in conjunction with the Ninth
Circuit's own previous definition of "imminent," clearly refuted
KFC's contention that RCRA's citizen suit provision does not re-
quire that there be the threat of endangerment at the time of the
suit for RCRA to apply.127
C. RCRA's Enforcement Scheme
The Court next focused on RCRA's enforcement scheme to
support its holding that RCRA's citizen suit provision does not al-
low for the recovery of past clean-up costs. 1 28 The lack of a statute
recovery provision in CERCLA and chose to amend RCRA while not using the
same comprehensive recovery provision demonstrates that Congress had no inten-
tion of allowing RCRA's citizen suit provision to operate in a manner identical to
CERCLA's citizen suit provision. Compare CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a) (4) (1994) with RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994).
125. See KFC 116 S. Ct. at 1255. For a discussion of the Court's interpretation
of RCRA's timing requirement, see supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text. See
also Randall James Butterfield, Note, Recovering Environmental dean-up Costs Under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: A Potential Solution to a Persistent Problem, 49
VAND. L. Rxv. 689, 720 (1996) (providing excellent explanation of "the continuing
endangerment requirement" under RCRA's citizen suit provision).
126. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1255 (stating RCRA allows suit "only upon a show-
ing that the solid or hazardous waste at issue 'may present an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to health or the environment'" (quoting RCRA
§ 7002(a) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1) (B) (1994))).
127. Id. The Court first looked to Webster's Dictionary to define "imminent."
For a discussion of the Court's analysis of the plain meaning of "imminent," see
supra notes 84-86. The Court then reprimanded the Ninth Circuit for interpreting
"imminent" by quoting a Ninth Circuit decision that was in direct conflict with the
Ninth Circuit's holding in KFC. See id. at 1255 (quoting Price v. United States, 39
F.3d 1011, 1019 (1994)). For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's definition
of imminent, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
It was likely that the Court was dubious of KFC's claim that the hazardous
waste was an "imminent" danger, because KFC had to amend this section of its
complaint in district court. See Respondent's Brief at *4, Meghrig v. KFC Western,
Inc., 1995 WL 728551 (1996) (No. 95-83). KFC's first complaint did not allege
that the hazardous waste presented an imminent endangerment at the time of suit.
See Petitioner's Brief at *6, Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 1995 WL 668003 (1996)
(No. 95-83) (noting that KFC amended its complaint to allege that contamination
'may have presented' (at some time in the past) an imminent and substantial
endangerment"). The phrase "may have presented" dearly is not an imminent
endangerment under a reading of RCRA's citizen suit provision. See KF 116 S.
Ct. at 1255.
128. See id. For a discussion of the Court's interpretation of other aspects of
the enforcement mechanisms contained in RCRA, see supra notes 93-100 and ac-
companying text.
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of limitations in RCRA'2 9 and its citizen suit provision's ninety-day
notice requirement both show strong support for the Court's find-
ing that RCRA does not allow recovery of past clean-up costs.1 3 0
However, the Court made a tenuous comparison to CERCLA by
noting that costs under CERCLA's citizen suit provision must be
"reasonable."131 The $211,000 which KFC spent on the clean-up of
the property can be see as reasonable without reference to a na-
tional contingency plan.'3 2
D. Equitable Remedies
The Court completed its analysis by addressing KFC's argu-
ment that RCRA's citizen suit provision allows for equitable restitu-
tion.133 The Court stated that courts cannot award clean-up costs
under RCRA's citizen suit provision if Congress has provided "elab-
orate enforcement provisions." 34 Further, the Court held that the
129. While not as pertinent as the discussion of the timing and remedies re-
quirements, the Court wisely looked to CERCLA to point out that statutes with a
retroactive citizen suit provision must also have a statute of limitations. See id. It is
unreasonable to assume Congress would have allowed individuals to bring suit for
past costs indefinitely. Such a result would be contrary to the remainder of the
citizen suit provision, which allows alleged violators to have the opportunity to
remedy their violations before a suit can be brought against them. See RCRA
§ 7002(b) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (2) (B). For a discussion of the argument
that RCRA gives alleged offenders an opportunity to remedy their violations, see
supra note 29.
130. The purpose of the ninety-day requirement is to give the person who is
allegedly violating RCRA an opportunity to remedy the situation before a suit is
brought against them. See RCRA § 7002 (b) (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (b) (2) (A).
For a further discussion of the purpose of the ninety-day requirement, see supra
note 29 and accompanying text. If the RCRA violation had already been reme-
died, as it was in KFC, then the ninety-day notice requirement would serve no pur-
pose. Therefore, the Court was correct to use this provision as evidence to support
its holding. See KFC 116 S. Ct. at 1255.
131. See KFC 116 S. Ct. at 1255.
132. See id. The Court's determination that all costs recovered under CER-
CIA's citizen suit provision be reasonable does not follow from CERCLA's require-
ment that costs be in accordance with a "national contingency plan." See CERCLA
§ 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). For a discussion of the relevant provi-
sion of CERCLA, see supra note 37 and accompanying text. It is not necessary to
have a "national contingency plan" to ensure that courts will award reasonable
costs. For example, the $211,000 of "equitable restitution" sought by KFC was a
"reasonable" amount, because it included only the cost to remove and dispose of
the oil tainted soil. See M7C, 116 S. Ct. at 1253.
133. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1253. For a discussion of the concepts of equitable
jurisdiction and equitable restitution, see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying
text.
134. See KM 116 S. Ct. at 1253 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clamnmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981)). The Court discussed the
availability of equitable restitution under RCRA's citizen suit, although it never
explicitly named equitable restitution as such during its discussion. See id. For a
28
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limited remedies available in RCRA's citizen suit provision, along
with the stark differences between it and CERCLA's citizen suit pro-
vision, prevent awards of past clean-up costs.1 3 5 Unfortunately,
however, the Court never directly stated that RCRA's citizen suit
provision foreclosed the courts' ability to grant equitable restitu-
tion, which would have foreclosed any further debate on this
issue. 136
E. Case Law
Prior judicial decisions also played an important role in the
Court's reasoning and consequent holding. The Court correctly ig-
nored the Cort v. Ash test that the Furrer court had used as a way to
determine whether RCRA supplies an implied remedy of restitu-
tion. 3 7 However, the Supreme Court mistakenly applied prece-
dent from Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n to determine whether Congress had revoked the
courts' ability to grant equitable restitution.
It is significant that the Court ignored the Eighth Circuit's rea-
soning in Furrer v. Brown.'38 The Court properly passed over the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Furrer, even though the end result of
both cases was the same. 139 By ignoring the reasoning put forth in
Furrer, the Court implicitly rejected the Eighth Circuit's use of the
discussion of the premise that a court retains equitable jurisdiction unless Con-
gress has dearly intended otherwise, see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
135. See id. at 1256.
136. See id. The Court stated that RCRA's citizen suit provision does not pre-
vent a private party from recovering its clean-up costs "under other federal or state
laws." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1988)). While preserving other causes of
actions, this section of RCRA's citizen suit does not address the concept of equita-
ble restitution. See RCRA § 7002(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f). By citing this section, the
Court failed to explicitly deny a claim for equitable restitution under RCRA's citi-
zen suit, leaving the issue undecided for future claimants. For a further discussion
of RCRA § 7002(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f), see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
137. For a discussion of the reasons why the Supreme Court was correct not
to use the Cort test, see infra notes 141-42. For a discussion of the test set forth in
Cort, see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
138. For a discussion of Furrer, see supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
139. The holdings in FC and Furrer were very similar. Compare KFC, 116 S.
Ct. at 1253 ("We consider whether [RCRA's citizen suit provision] authorizes a
private cause of action to recover the prior costs of cleaning up toxic waste ....
We conclude that it does not.") with Furrer, 62 F.3d 1092, 1100 (1995) ("In sum,
none of the four Cort factors tips the scales in favor of implying in [RCRA's citizen
suit provision] a cause of action to recover clean-up costs."). The fact that the
Supreme Court did not employ the Cort analysis implies that the Court disap-
proved of the Eighth Circuit's use of the Cort test.
1997]
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Cort test' 4° as a method of determining whether KFC could recover
damages under RCRA's citizen suit provision.1 41 Indeed, the Court
correctly ignored the reasoning in Furrer, because the Cort test is
used to determine whether a statute provides for an implicit cause
of action, rather than whether a statute provides for a monetary
remedy.142 Therefore, although the end results were the same, the
Supreme Court was correct to refuse to recognize the Cort analysis.
Although it utilized the Middlesex test in its analysis, the Court
misapplied this test. Because the Middlesex test provides a method
of interpreting a statute by considering other sections of the same
statute, the Court misused the Middlesex test by using CERCLA to
interpret RCRA. 143 While the misapplication of Middlesex is prob-
lematic, the Court's holding that no equitable restitution was avail-
able can still be supported by the remainder of the opinion.
When the Court stated that RCRA's citizen suit provision only
provides for mandatory injunctions and prohibitory injunctions,'4
140. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's application of the test set forth in
Cor, see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
141. The Court could have simply followed the reasoning set forth in Furrer,
or at least could have used the Furrer opinion as evidence of the proper interpreta-
tion of RCRA. The Court did not apply Furer, thereby casting doubt as to the
validity of the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in that case. Rather, the Court only men-
tioned the Eighth Circuit's reasoning to say that the "Ninth Circuit's conclusion
regarding the remedies available under RCRA conflicts with the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Furrer v. Brown." KIF, 116 S. Ct. at 1253-
54.
142. See Cort, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975). In Cort, the Supreme Court devised a
test to determine if an implied cause of action existed under a criminal statute
prohibiting corporations from making election contributions. See id. at 80. In Fur-
rer, the Eighth Circuit decided whether "it was Congress' intent to authorize a
monetary remedy for private citizens when it enacted § 6972, or more precisely,
when it amended the statute in 1984." Fu-er, 62 F.3d at 1904 (emphasis added).
The Eighth Circuit incorrectly applied a test for an implied cause of action to a
claim for implied remedies. Thus, the Supreme Court in KO appropriately ig-
nored the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Corr.
143. See KM 116 S. Ct. at 1256. The Court stated that RCRA's limited reme-
dies along with CERCLA show that Congress has limited the courts' ability to award
equitable restitution. See id. The case that the Court cites, however, deals with the
provisions within the statute in question, rather than a combination of different
acts. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 14 (1981).
The Court dismissed the Eighth Circuit's use of the Cort test for a similar argu-
ment based on misuse of precedence. For a discussion of the Court's implicit dis-
missal of the Eight Circuit's use of the Cort test, see supra note 137 and
accompanying text. The Court fell prey to the same misapplication of past prece-
dence by applying Middlesex to RCRA's citizen suits' remedies along with CERCLA's
citizen suits' remedies.
144. "Under a plain reading of RCRA's remedial scheme ... a private citizen
could seek a mandatory injunction... or a prohibitory injunction." KIo, 116 S.
Ct. at 1254. For a discussion of the Court's holding on injunctive remedies as well
30
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it eliminated the possibility that equitable restitution was available
under RCRA's citizen suit provision. 145 However, the Court's mis-
application of Middlesex may lead to confusion the next time a con-
troversy arises over equitable restitution in other environmental
contexts. Future litigants trying to determine whether the courts
are going to exercise equitable jurisdiction will not know if they
should look solely to the statute under which they are filing suit, or
if they should couple different environmental acts in order to deter-
mine Congressional intent. Finally, the Court left open the possi-
bility of recovery of clean-up costs if the costs are incurred after a
RCRA suit has been properly commenced.' 46
VI. IMPACT
The Court has left open the possibility for recovery of clean-up
costs incurred after a RCRA citizen suit has been filed, but before
any court order has been announced.1 47 It seems that such a situa-
as mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, see supra note 90 and accompanying
text.
145. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1254. While the statute does not seem to meet the
Porter test which requires that a statute must "in so many words, or by a necessary
and inescapable inference, restrict[ ] the court's jurisdiction in equity," the Court
did not address this issue. Id.; see also Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398
(1946).
146. See KFC, 116 S. Ct. at 1256. The possibility of recovery of dean-up costs
incurred after a RCRA suit has been properly commenced was posed to the De-
partment of Justice during oral argument:
Question: Suppose the plaintiff had immediately given notice to the de-
fendant [in October], but during the 90-day period itself under pressure,
say, from town authorities, plaintiff starts cleaning up and then has to
wait those 90 days to bring the suit.... From October to February. The
plaintiff has already incurred a substantial sum. Then from the time the
suit begins in February until March the clean-up is done, plaintiff incurs
further expenses.
Is it your position that all of the expenses during the 90-day period
plus after suit commences are reimbursable[,] or only after the suit
commences?
Oral Argument at *29, Meghrig v. KFC, Western Inc., 1996 WL 14515 (1996) (No.
95-83)). A similar question was posed to the Meghrigs:
Question: But suppose that the court ordered the previous owner to
clean-up under this statute [RCRA] with proper notice and the owner is
contumacious. He does not obey the court's order. And the plaintiff
then, giving due notice again of his intent, undertakes to clean up the -
and stop the waste himself.
As an ordinary measure of contempt of court sanctions, is not the
plaintiff entitled to recover the cost that he expended to avoid the harm
that the defendant, in contempt of the Court's order, refused to under-
take on his own?
Id. at *16.
147. See KR, 116 S. Ct. at 1256.
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tion would meet the timing requirement set forth in KFC. The
vital component to such a claim would be the filing of a RCRA
claim before attempting a clean-up of hazardous waste. 149
The Court refused to recognize any cause of action under
RCRA when the clean-up of hazardous waste has already oc-
curred. 150 Parties who find themselves in a situation where they
have already abated the endangerment of hazardous waste, how-
ever, do have the options of bringing an action under other federal
148. The KFC Court stressed that there were two main requirements to bring
suit under RCRA's citizen suit provision: a timing requirement and an appropriate
remedy requirement. See id. at 1255. For a discussion of the timing and remedy
requirements under RCRA's citizen suit, see supra notes 82-92 and accompanying
text. Using the Court's hypothetical situations in note 146, when a potential plain-
tiff under RCRA gives a potential defendant notice of the plaintiff's intent to dean
up the contaminated area, the need to meet the timing and remedy requirements
seem to be met. This senario would seem to meet these two requirements for the
following reasons.
First, as for the "timing" requirement, there are three steps needed to meet the
"imminent" requirement: first, that the plaintiff filed suit previous to their dean-
up measures. This would allow the court to exercise its jurisdiction over the mat-
ter. Second, the alleged defendant has to be notified of the suit, and has made no
action to remedy the situation. This could be a refusal to follow a court order, as
in the Court's second hypothetical in note 146. Third, the plaintiff has to meet
the factual issue of whether the waste was an "imminent and substantial endanger-
ment." However, as long as the plaintiff can prove that the waste was threatening
to cause harm immediately, the plaintiff would meet the "imminent" standard. See
KF, 116 S. Ct. at 1255 (defining "imminent"). Therefore, a plaintiff who files suit
against an alleged violator, and begins to clean up the site because of the threat
posed by hazardous waste, would seem to have fulfilled the timing requirement.
Cf. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1989) (allowing exception
to notice requirement). For a discussion of Hallstrom, see supra note 38 and ac-
companying text.
Second, in order to meet the "remedy" requirement set forth in KFC, the
plaintiff would have to request an injunction requiring the other party to repay the
plaintiff for his clean-up costs. See KFC, 116 S. Ct at 1256. This injunction would
be seen as a "mandatory injunction" as described by the Court in KRC. See id. at
1254 (allowing injunction that "orders a responsible party to 'take action' by at-
tending to the clean-up and proper disposal of toxic waste"). This injunction
would fulfill the KFC requirement that the injunction requires the defendant "to
take action and attend to the clean-up." Id. Therefore, both the "imminent en-
dangerment" and the "remedy requirement" would be met, and the suit would be
allowed to proceed. See id.
149. For a discussion of why the recovery of clean-up costs incurred after a
RCRA citizen suit was filed, but before the court had taken action, see supra note
148 and accompanying text. During oral arguments, KFC presented a variation on
the hypotheticals given by the Court to the Meghrigs and the Justice Department.
See Oral Argument at *33-34, Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 1996 WL 14515 (1996)
(No. 95-83). KFC stated that this hypothetical was a very small progression from
the typically successful RCRA citizen suit, to which the Supreme Court answered:
"Yes, after the case is pending.... [T] he court could order that." Oral Argument
at *34, Meghrig (No. 95-83) (emphasis added). For a discussion of hypotheticals
that the Court presented to the parties during oral argument, see supra note 146
and accompanying text.
150. See KO¢, 116 S. Ct. at 1256.
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statutes, state statutes or the common law.151 Unfortunately, those
who have eliminated the danger of petroleum waste, like KFC, will
be unable to use CERCLA's citizen suit provision. 152 For these par-
ties, it is clear that they may not employ RCRA to recover their ex-
penses. While this may not be the most "equitable" solution, it is
clear that any change in remedies available under RCRA's citizen
suit must come from Congress, for it will not come from the courts.
Timothy f Sullivan
151. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. RCRA states that "[n]othing in
[RCRA's citizen suit] shall restrict any right which any other persons ... may have
under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or requirement
relating to the management of solid waste or hazardous waste, or to seek any other
relief" RCRA § 7002(f, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1994) (emphasis added).
152. See CERCILA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994). CERCLA does not
cover any petroleum products. For a discussion of the relevant provision of CER-
CLA, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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